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Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rock v. Arkansas,' the United States Supreme Court ex-
panded the range of evidence available to the defense in state crimi-
nal trials to include a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony.2
Grounding its decision in the fifth,3 sixth,4 and fourteenth 5 amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, the Court held that "Ar-
kansas' per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony infringes
impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his or her
own behalf."'6 By allowing a criminal defendant to present poten-
1 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
2 Id. at 2714. "Hypnotically refreshed testimony" is the statement under oath of a
witness as to his or her memory of matters recalled as a result of undergoing hypnosis.
It is at least inferentially distinct from "posthypnosis testimony" and "hypnotically in-
duced" or "adduced testimony," the former suggesting all statements made subsequent
to undergoing hypnosis and the latter implying statements made under the influence of
hypnosis. Courts and commentators use these phrases without distinction often to char-
acterize the issue in a manner favorable to their conclusions. As used throughout this
Note, however, "hypnotically refreshed testimony" is intended to be a neutral label.
3 "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.
4 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
5 "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15. The Court misstates the scope of the Arkansas rule.
Only testimony on matters recalled due to hypnosis was deemed inadmissible in Rock v.
State, 288 Ark. 566, 573, 708 S.W.2d 78, 83 (1986). Earlier in its opinion, the Court
correctly said that the Arkansas court ruled that testimony the defendant could "prove
to be the product of prehypnosis memory" was admissible. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
853
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
tially unreliable evidence 7 to the factfinder in this case, the Court
gave a liberal reading to the constitutional provisions permitting the
criminally accused to present a defense. The Court thus defined fu-
ture debate surrounding the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony in constitutional terms.
This Note argues that this reading of the constitutional protec-
tions afforded criminal defendants provides an appropriate and
functional means for constructing an acceptable standard for deter-
mining the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in crim-
inal trials. In response to the Court's decision in Rock, this Note
argues that hypnotically refreshed testimony offered by the defense
in criminal trials should generally be admitted and that hypnotically
refreshed testimony offered by the prosecution ought to be gener-
ally excluded. This bifurcated rule of admissibility protects criminal
defendants by erring always in the defendant's favor. It furthers ju-
dicial efficiency by confining the scope of a trial court's inquiry in
determinations of admissibility to constitutional considerations.
Moreover, this guideline strikes a fair balance between judicial con-
cerns for accuracy of evidence admitted in criminal trials and just
resolution of the dispute at issue.
II. BACKGROUND
Centuries of conjecture, research, quackery, and experiment
have resulted in little empirical certainty about the phenomenon of
hypnosis.8 Defying definition,9 hypnosis has been endorsed as a
therapeutic technique for three decades. 10 To date, however, the
scientific community has not encouraged the use of hypnosis as a
truth-inducing device."1 Because this skepticism lies at the heart of
7 See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
8 For a brief overview of the history of hypnosis, see generally Diamond, Inherent
Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 316-21
(1980). See also sources cited infra note 36.
9 Hypnosis is characterized by a subject's increased responsiveness to sugges-
tions. Typically these suggestions involve the person's ability to experience aitera-
tions of perception, memory, or mood. Regardless of whether the phemomenon is
conceptualized as an altered state of consciousness, as believed-in imagining, as
role enactment, as fantasy absorption, or as focused attention, hypnosis is a real
experience; the hypnotized individual believes in it and is not merely acting as if hedid.
M. ORNE, D. SOSKIS, D. DINGES, E. ORNE & M. TONRY, HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTI-
MoNY: ENHANCED MEMORY OR TAMPERING wrrH EVIDENCE? 6 (National Institute ofJus-
tice Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice, 1985) [hereinafter M. ORNE].
10 By 1960, both the American Medical Association and the American Psychological
Association had officially recognized the therapeutic value of hypnosis. Id. at 29.
11 Leading authorities on the use of hypnosis in the criminal justice system believe
hypnosis may be an appropriate tool for eliciting investigative leads. Id. at 30. Most
warn, however, that, without independent verification, information obtained through
854 [Vol. 78
HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY
the legal debate surrounding the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony, some understanding of the current state of scien-
tific knowledge about hypnosis is required. 12
Typically, hypnosis sessions begin with a period known as in-
duction.' 3 The hypnotist initially establishes some rapport with the
subject by discussing the purpose of the session and by making cer-
tain that the subject freely wishes to proceed. 14 Through a variety
of methods, 15 the subject is then asked to focus intensely on the
hypnotist, to relax, and to try to visualize what the hypnotist is
saying.16
Once hypnotized, 17 the subject generally becomes increasingly
willing to suspend his or her critical judgment.' Apparently, this
results in a response criterion shift, 19 which is a willingness to report
details about events that are usually rejected as too unsure to re-
lay.20 Unfortunately, this laxed response criterion often results in
an increase in inaccurate as well as accurate recollections. 21
hypnosis cannot be relied upon as accurate. Id. at 51. They, therefore, oppose the use
of hypnosis to form the basis for a witness' testimony in court. Id. at 27. See also R.
UDOLF, FORENSIC HYPNOSIS 9-10 (1983). "[Using hypnosis] as an investigative or dis-
covery device to develop leads to new and independent evidence... is the most appro-
priate and potentially the most productive use.... It is best limited to witnesses whose
testimony is not likely to be needed at trial." Id. at 157.
12 The lack of resolution of this question of admissibility has been attributed in great
part to legal misunderstandings of scientific conclusions regarding hypnosis. R. UDOLF,
supra note 11, at 8. The scientific community suffers from an analogous lack of sensitiv-
ity to the requirements of the criminal justice system. Id. at 6.
13 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 7. Induction is "[t]he procedure used by the hypnotist to
bring about the condition or state of hypnosis." Id. at 66.
'4 Id. at 7.
15 "Many different procedures can be used to induce hypnosis." Id. However, the
authors did not elaborate on these techniques.
16 Id.
17 Hypnotizability, the ability of an individual "to respond to hypnotic induction and
to experience hypnotic suggestions," id. at 66, varies widely among individuals. Id. at 6.
18 Id. at 9.
Individuals who are hypnotized are generally relaxed, less anxious, and less critical
than when not hypnotized. The context of hypnosis allows subjects to say things
about which they are uncertain-things that would not be said in contexts where
subjects feel responsible for their memories and challenged about their consistency.
Id.
19 The response or report criterion is "[t]he variable psychological threshold at
which a subject is willing to report his recollections; the level of the criterion will depend
upon the context in which an individual is asked to report as well as upon his critical
judgment at the time." Id. at 67.
20 Id. at 19 (citing the results of an independent study).
21 Id. Subjective uncertainty and objective inaccuracy have no necessary logical cor-
relation. However, the "problem with hypnotically refreshed recall is that false recollec-
tions are often experienced not as guesses, but rather, as contextually appropriate and
meaningful memories." Id. at 20. This is particularly significant in a legal context.
Given the nature of factfinding in litigation, which involves the piecing together of facts
19881 -855
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Distinct from, yet congruent with, the lowered response crite-
rion is the hypnotized subject's increased suggestibility resulting
from the attention he or she focuses on the hypnotist. 22 Having sus-
pended his or her critical judgment, the subject may be anxious to
please the questioner by responding favorably to both the explicit
and implicit suggestions made by the hypnotist or anyone else pres-
ent at the session.23 This may lead the subject to confabulate, or fill
gaps in his or her memory with plausible, but not necessarily accu-
rate, data.24 It may also result in pseudomemory, which is a per-
ceived recollection where there is no memory at all. 25
Additionally, the subject's preconceptions about the ability of
hypnosis to induce recollections 26 and the nature of the hypnotist's
questions27 enhance the possibility of inaccurate recall.28 A subject
may unconsciously alter his or her responses during hypnosis in ac-
cordance with any expectations he or she has prior to the session.29
There is also evidence that hypnotized subjects make more errors in
responding to leading questions than non-hypnotized subjects.30
derived from multiple sources, what is determined to be the truth for the purposes of a
trial may be based on unreliable information because of the elimination, through hypno-
sis, of the subjective uncertainty of a witness that is relayed as certainty.
22 Id. at 6.
Of course, inadvertent influences by the interviewer can occur even without hypno-
sis, particularly when the witness is asked to comment upon specific details of an
event. A critical question concerning hypnosis, however, is the extent to which it
significantly increases the impact of biasing procedures on the memories reported by
the subject.
Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
23 Id. at 8. See also COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, Scientific Status of Refreshing Recol-
lections by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 J. A.M.A. 1918, 1919 (1985)[hereinafter COUNCIL].
24 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 10. See also COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 1920. One study
in which hypnotized subjects were asked to recite poetry they had learned years prior to
the experiment demonstrates the confabulation phenomenon. The subjects recited
more verses under hypnosis than they could prior to being hypnotized, but subsequent
comparison with the actual poems revealed that the subjects improvised language and
mimicked the poet's style. M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 10-11. See also COUNCIL, supra note
23, at 1920.
25 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 11. Pseudomemory is "[a] false recollection that may be
brought about by confabulation, suggestion, and organic factors. Though factually inac-
curate, they [pseudomemories] are accepted by the subject as actual recollections." Id.
at 67. See also COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 1922.
26 Prehypnotic suggestion encompasses "[ildeas presented to the subject prior to
hypnosis as though they are factual or in the form of suggestive statements, which imply
how the individual will respond either during or after hypnosis or both." M. ORNE, supra
note 9, at 66.
27 Questions eliciting recall memory are open-ended and allow the subject to freely
respond while questions eliciting recognition memory are detailed and usually require a
yes, no, or multiple choice answer. COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 1920.
28 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 7.
29 Id. at 8.
30 Id. at 22 (citing the results of an independent study). Moreover, "there is no evi-
856 [Vol. 78
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Compounding these accuracy problems is a change in confi-
dence subjects often experience after hypnosis as a result of their
perceived increased recollection.31 This phenomenon becomes par-
ticularly significant in the context of a trial.3 2 A witness who testifies
with self-assurance, even if misplaced, and in great detail, though
inaccurate, is considerably more credible to a jury than his or her
less confident and less descriptive counterpart. 33 A witness whose
confidence has been artificially increased is also less vulnerable to
cross-examination. 34 Thus, the risk inherent in admitting hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony in a trial is an outcome based on unrelia-
ble information.3 5 This risk forms the basis for the legal debate as
to whether hypnotically refreshed testimony ought to be admitted in
criminal trials.3 6
Prior to Rock, four states adopted evidentiary rules which stated
that hypnosis of a witness affects the crediblity, but not the admissi-
bility, of his or her testimony.3 7 Noting the elimination of compe-
dence of increased recollection by means of hypnosis for recall memory of meaningless
material or of recognition memory for any types of material." COUNCIL, supra note 23, at
1922.
31 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 25. "[H]ypnosis can either increase the inaccuracy of
recollections without diminishing confidence in the 'memories,' or it can increase confi-
dence without increasing accuracy, or both. The amount of confidence and certitude an
individual associates with his remembrances is more a function of hypnotic responsive-
ness than accuracy." Id. See also COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 1921.
32 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 24.
33 Id. at 25.
34 Id. at 27.
35 Id. at 26. The situation best illustrating the risks run by relying on hypnosis to
reveal the truth is one in which the media, the authorities, the hypnotist, or the subject
believe they know an answer and want it confirmed by hypnotically refreshed recall.
Affirmation of the presumed information by the subject is likely because the idea is
planted in his or her mind. Unfortunately, the recollection may be solely the product of
suggestion. Id. at 30.
36 A comprehensive survey of the extensive legal literature devoted to the use of
hypnosis in the criminal justice system would be onerous and of little help. A cross
section of articles written on this topic over the last five years includes: Falk, Posthypnotic
Testimony-Witness Competency and the Fulcrum of Procedural Safeguards, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
30 (1982); Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of Hypnotically-Induced Testimony in
Criminal Trials, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 927 (1983); Sies & Wester, Judicial Approaches to the
Question ofAdmissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony: A History and Analysis, 35 DE PAUL
L. REV. 77 (1985); Comment, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 20 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 223 (1984); Comment, Hypnosis in Our Legal System: The Status of its Accept-
ance in the Trial Setting, 16 AKRON L. REV. 517 (1983); Note, Excluding Hypnotically Induced
Testimony on the "Hearsay Rationale", 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 619 (1986); Note, Hypnotically In-
duced Testimony: Credibility versus Admissibility, 57 IND. LJ. 349 (1982); Note, Refreshing
Memory Through Hypnosis-Admissibility of Witness Testimony, 9 OKLA. CITy U.L. REV. 149
(1984).
37 State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983); State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138,
151 (N.D. 1983); State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106, 115 (Tenn. 1985)(adopting State v.
857
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tency standards in modem rules of evidence 38 and the adequacy,
though added difficulty, of cross-examination to challenge testimo-
nial reliability, courts in these states fashioned a rule deferring eval-
uation of a witness' veracity to the factfinder.39 Essentially, each of
the state supreme courts reasoned that, as a logical matter, any at-
tempt to preserve testimony from external suggestion would require
that lawyers not be allowed to talk with witnesses prior to trial and
that friends and relatives of a party be excluded from the court-
room. 40 Each court also concluded that an increased exposure of
the factfinder to expert testimony is preferable to an exclusion of
potentially relevant information.41
Modifying this rule, five states adopted an admissibility stan-
dard requiring that the hypnosis session comply with specific proce-
dures before any hypnotically refreshed testimony would be
considered for submission to the factfinder.42 These states en-
Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1981)); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d
1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982).
38 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 601: "Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules."
39 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 151 (N.D. 1983)(defendant's conviction
for felonious restraint not based on error of admitting alleged victim's posthypnotic
identification because other evidence corroborated the identification).
40 See, e.g., id.
41 See, e.g., id.
42 House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 827 (Miss. 1984); State v. Hurd, 86 NJ. 525, 543,
432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 690, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (1981);
State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 580, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394-95 (1983), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 946 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.675 (1985). The Oregon statute states:
If either prosecution or defense in any criminal proceeding in the State of Oregon
intends to offer the testimony of any person, including the defendant, who has been
subjected to hypnosis, mesmerism or any other form of the exertion of will power
or the power of suggestion which is intended to or results in a state of trance, sleep
or entire or partial unconsciousness relating to the subject matter of the proposed
testimony, performed by any person, it shall be a condition of the use of such testi-
mony that the entire procedure be recorded either on videotape or any mechanical
recording device. The unabridged videotape or mechanical recording shall be
made available to the other party or parties in accordance with ORS 135.805 to
135.873.
This language implies that evidence obtained through hypnosis must be admitted if the
recording and disclosure requirements are met. R. UDOLF, supra note 11, at 97.
The so-called Hurd guidelines, first proposed by Dr. Martin Orne and adopted by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), are
the most well-known procedural prerequisites:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct
the session.... Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be
independent of... the prosecutor, investigator, or defense [so as to avoid leading
questions].... Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement
personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in
writing or another suitable form.... Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist
should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject
remembers them.... Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must
be recorded.... Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
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dorsed safeguards intended to reduce the amount of suggestion to
which a witness is exposed while also preserving for judicial review a
record of the hypnotist's questioning.43 They also determined that
it is the responsibility of the trial court to ascertain whether, given
the kind of memory loss alleged, hypnosis is an appropriate means
of inducing recall,44 whether the safeguards have been properly
taken,45 and whether the testimony is reasonably reliable.46
In State v. Iwakiri,47 the Supreme Court of Idaho formulated an-
other alternative with an added level of judicial discretion. 48 The
court adopted a rule whereby trial judges are permitted to overlook
noncompliance with any of the procedural safeguards cited in the
opinion to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony if the totality of
the circumstances of the case so warrants.49 The court reasoned
that this case-by-case standard, requiring a trial court to hold pre-
trial hearings on the competency of the formerly-hypnotized wit-
ness, 50 would balance the benefits and dangers of using hypnosis.51
The court asserted that the standard squares with other rules of evi-
dence that place an initial determination of the reliability of a wit-
ness upon "the entity most experienced in dealing with evidentiary
questions, the trial court," 52 before submitting the evidence to the
jury.53
In opposition to these variations on admissibility rules, four
states held prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rock that pos-
any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-
hypnotic interview.
Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97 (emphasis in original). In addition to these guidelines
for the hypnosis session itself, a party wishing to use hypnosis on a potential witness
must inform and provide a record of the session to the opposing party. Id. at 543, 432
A.2d at 95.
43 See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 545, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (1981)(trial court's exclu-
sion of alleged victim's identification of her former husband as her assailant sustained
primarily because of the pressure exerted upon her by the hypnotist to make that
identification).
44 See, e.g., id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
45 See, e.g., id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96.
46 See, e.g., id., 432 A.2d at 97.
47 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984)(defendant's conviction for second-degree
kidnapping reversed and remanded on another issue, with the trial court instructed to
introduce the hypnotically refreshed testimony of a state witness on remand).
48 Id. at 625, 682 P.2d at 578.
49 Id., 682 P.2d at 578.
50 Id., 682 P.2d at 578.
51 Id. at 625-26, 682 P.2d at 579.
52 Id. at 626, 682 P.2d. at 579.
53 Id., 682 P.2d at 579. Accord Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind.
1983) (Hunter, J., concurring)(clarifying decision in Peterson to exclude alleged victim's
hypnotically refreshed identification of defendant as endorsing rule that fits somewhere
between per se exclusion and general admissibility standard).
1988] 859
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thypnosis testimony is per se inadmissible in criminal trials. 54 An-
other fourteen states refused to admit hypnotically refreshed
testimony, but allowed a formerly hypnotized witness to testify as to
his or her prehypnosis memory. 55 Also, three states leaned toward a
general rule of inadmissibility. 56 Applying the scientific acceptance
standard of Frye v. United States,57 these twenty-one state courts uni-
formly rejected the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony because
of a lack of consensus among the academic, scientific, and health
care professions as to what effect hypnosis has upon memory. 58 The
54 People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 66-67, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
273 (witness only competent to testify on matters unrelated to hypnosis session), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, -, 479 A.2d 258,
264 (1984); People v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 627, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1982), modi-
fied, 417 Mich. 1129, 1129, 336 N.W.2d 751, 751 (1983)(reserving question of witness'
ability to testify as to prehypnosis memory); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 545, 453
N.E.2d 484, 496, 59 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266 (1983) (permitting pretrial hearing to determine
if witness competent to testify as to prehypnosis memory).
55 Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 133, 139 (Alaska 1986); State ex rel. Collins v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 207-208, 644 P.2d 1266, 1293, 1295 (1982); Rock v.
State, 288 Ark. 566, 573, 576, 708 S.W.2d 78, 81, 83, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986),
rev'd 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 711 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986);
Walraven v. State, 255 Ga. 276, 282, 336 S.E.2d 798, 803 (1985); State v. Moreno, -
Haw. -, -, 709 P.2d 103, 105 (1985); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 482, 701 P.2d
909, 925 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702,
464 A.2d 1028, 1044 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 528, 447 N.E.2d
1190, 1197 (1983); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981),
modified, 224 Neb. 282, 298, 399 N.W.2d 706, 719 (1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 206
(1987); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 533, 319 S.E.2d 177, 187 (1984); Robinson v.
State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); State v.
Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 722, 684 P.2d 651, 657 (1984).
56 State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420, 431 (Iowa 1983)("We conclude that if the trial
testimony of the witnesses.., is substantially the same as that in statements.., prior to
their being hypnotized . . . such testimony should be deemed admissible."); State v.
Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 513-14 (Minn. 1984)("[T]his court has consistently adhered to
the rule of general inadmissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony in criminal
cases .... It will be a rare case when a conviction will be sustained if hypnotically-
influenced testimony is used at trial."); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 111,
436 A.2d 170, 178 (198 1)("While we do not want to establish a per se rule of inadmissi-
bility at this time, we will not permit the introduction of hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony until we are presented with more conclusive proof . . . of the reliability of
hypnotically-retrieved memory.").
57 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1925)("[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.").
58 See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 139 (Alaska 1986), in which the appel-
late court's admission of hypnotically refreshed identification by victims in separate suits
was reversed.
[The Frye test is] appropriate when reviewing the admission of new types of scien-
tific evidence [because]: 1) the standard is judicially manageable; 2) the standard
saves judicial time and resources; 3) the standard assures that juries will not be
860 [Vol. 78
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courts deemed that the prejudicial impact of potentially inaccurate
testimony outweighed any probative value it may have for a jury.59
They asserted that such a per se rule would be administratively effi-
cient,60 uniform in its application, 6' and, given the possibility of an
increase in false confidence by a once-hypnotized witness, protective
of a defendant's right to confront his or her opposition.62 The
states that, nevertheless, allowed a formerly hypnotized witness to
testify as to his or her prehypnosis memory did so in order to guar-
antee testimonial rights while preserving the use of hypnosis as an
investigative tool.63 By placing the burden of proving the scope of
the witness' prehypnosis memory on the party offering the testi-
mony, these courts attempted to regulate the use of hypnosis. 64 At
the same time, these courts eased any harmful impact the per se rule
might have upon witnesses opting for hypnosis. 65
Notably absent from the fact situations inducing these decisions
is a case in which hypnosis was used on a defense witness or defend-
ant prior to trial.66 The risks inherent in hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony remain. 67 But, those concerns are elevated because it is
possible that a subject may feign hypnosis or willfully lie while hyp-
notized.68 This possibility is exacerbated by the fact that, even with
misled by unproven, unsound 'scientific' procedures, thus safeguarding the court's
truth-finding role; and 4) the standard assures fairness and uniformity of decision-
making.
Id. at 135.
59 See, e.g., id. at 137. See also FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue de-
lay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
60 See, e.g., Contreras, 718 P.2d at 138.
61 See, e.g., id. at 137.
62 See, e.g., id. at 138-39.
63 See, e.g., id. at 139 (construing State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 533, 319 S.E.2d 177,
188 (1984)).
64 See, e.g., id. (construing Peop/es, 311 N.C. at 533, 319 S.E.2d at 188).
65 See, e.g., id.
66 But cf. Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INr'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERI-
MENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 313-14 (1979).
Because the defendant in a legal case is highly motivated to utilize the hypnotic
situation to aid his cause, great care must be taken in the interpretation of hypnotic
material. It must also be kept in mind that the hypnotic session, which may involve
displays of considerable affect [sic], is extremely arousing and compelling to the
naive observer.
Id.
67 See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
68 M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 31-32. A strong motivation to deceive makes overcom-
ing the effects of hypnosis possible. Id. at 9-10. For this reason, "there is no justification
for the authorities hypnotizing suspects in a case." Id. at 31. See also R. UDOLF, supra
note 11, at 160. Moreover, the use of hypnosis to elicit a confession is unduly coercive.
M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 32; R. UDOLF, supra note 11, at 159. Cf Leyra v. Denno, 347
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procedural safeguards, 69 it is difficult to identify subjects who are
faking hypnosis. 70
However, a criminal defendant's offer of hypnotically refreshed
testimony confounds the evidentiary standards discussed hereto-
fore. The commitment to the integrity of the jury system displayed
by the credibility, but not admissibility, standard, the allegiance to
judicial discretion for determining the admissibility of reliable evi-
dence furthered by the procedural prerequisites parameters, and
the efficiency and confrontation-enabling objectives of the per se in-
admissibility rule are valid evidentiary concerns. But, additional is-
sues emerge if evidentiary rules directly challenge the ability of a
criminal defendant to present a defense. The difficulty in formulat-
ing rules to respond to all of these interests is to prioritize the evi-
dentiary objectives so as to ensure fair application in a variety of
unpredictable fact situations.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the night of July 2, 1983, police officers found Frank Rock
lying on the floor of the apartment he shared with his wife, Vickie
Lorene Rock.7 1 Frank had suffered a bullet wound in his chest.72
Vickie and Frank had apparently argued earlier that night about
moving from their apartment to a trailer Vickie owned outside of
town. 73 Shortly thereafter, the State of Arkansas charged Vickie
with manslaughter for the death of her husband.74
At trial, one of the officers present at the scene testified that
Vickie told him that, at some point during the argument, she stood
up to leave the room and Frank " 'grabbed her by the throat and
choked her and threw her against the wall and . . . at that time she
walked over and picked up the weapon and pointed it toward the
floor and he hit her again and she shot him.' "75 Another officer
U.S. 556, 561 (1954)("We hold that use of confessions extracted in such a manner
[through intensive questioning of a physically and emotionally exhausted suspect by
psychiatriast trained in hypnosis] from a lone defendant unprotected by counsel is not
consistent with due process of law as required by our Constitution.")
69 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Additional recommendations include
videotaping all contacts between the hypnotist and subject, standard application of hyp-
nosis with minimal prehypnotic or posthypnotic suggestion of the likelihood of in-
creased memory, and further consultations after the hypnosis session to determine the
subject's hypnotic responsivity. M. ORNE, supra note 9, at 43-48.
70 Id. at 11.
71 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2706.
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testified that Vickie:
had told her husband that she was going to go outside. He refused to
let her leave and grabbed her by the throat and began choking her.
They struggled for a moment and she grabbed a gun. She told him to
leave her alone and he hit her at which time the gun went off. She
stated that it was an accident and she didn't mean to shoot him. She
said she had to go to the hospital to talk to him. 76
Prior to trial, however, Vickie could not remember the precise de-
tails about Frank's shooting.77
Upon the suggestion of her attorney, Vickie agreed to undergo
hypnosis to refresh her memory.78 Before being hypnotized, Vickie
made a statement of what she could remember to Doctor Bettye79
Back, a licensed neuropsychologist specially trained in hypnosis,
who took notes of their conversation.80 Vickie was hypnotized, but
revealed no new information until after the sessions.81 Vickie then
remembered that during the argument with Frank she had her
thumb on the hammer of the gun and did not have her finger on the
trigger.8 2 The gun, she said, discharged when Frank grabbed her
arm.
83
Based on this information, Vickie's attorney had a gun expert
examine the weapon.8 4 The expert concluded that the gun was de-
fective and prone to fire when hit or dropped.8 5 The expert testified
at trial that the trigger of the weapon did not have to be pulled for it
to discharge.8 6 After learning of Vickie's hypnosis session, the pros-
ecutor successfully filed a motion to exclude her hypnotically re-
76 Id. at 2706 n.1.
77 Id. at 2706.
78 Id.
79 Two spellings, "Betty" and "Bettye" are offered in the Court opinion. "Bettye" is
consistent with Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 568, 708 S.W.2d 78, 79 (1986).
80 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2706. Dr. Back's handwritten notes read as follows:
"Pt. states she & husb. were discussing moving out to a trailer she had prey. owned.
He was 'set on' moving out to the trailer-she felt they should discuss. She
bec(ame) upset & went to another room to lay down. Bro. came & left. She came
out to eat some of the pizza, he wouldn't allow her to have any. She said she would
go out and get (something) to eat he wouldn't allow her-He pushed her against a
wall an end table in the comer (with) a gun on it. They were the night watchmen for
business that sets behind them. She picked gun up stated she didn't want him hit-
ting her anymore. He wouldn't let her out the door, slammed door & 'gun went off
& he fell & he died.'"
Id. at 2706-07 n.2.








freshed testimony.8 7 The court's pretrial order read, in part,
" 'Defendant may testify to matters remembered and stated to the
examiner 8 prior to being placed under hypnosis. Testimony result-
ing from post-hypnotic suggestion will be excluded.' "89 The trial
judge and the prosecutor admitted that, as a result of this order,
"ninety-nine percent" of Vickie's testimony was deemed inadmissi-
ble.90 Thejury convicted Vickie of manslaughter and sentenced her
to ten years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.91
The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the conviction, hold-
ing that "the dangers of admitting [hypnotically refreshed] testi-
mony outweigh whatever probative value it may have." 92 The court
observed that "a defendant's right to testify is fundamental, but
even that right is not without limits." 93 The court reasoned that
Vickie's testimony was limited only by the standard rules of evi-
dence.94 Moreover, the court stated that "nothing was excluded
that would have been of much assistance to appellant, or would have
enlarged on her testimony to any significant degree." 95 Therefore,
the court concluded, there was no violation of Vickie's constitu-
tional rights.96
The United States Supreme Court granted Vickie's petition for
certiorari to review the Arkansas high court's decision. 97 The Court
framed the issue as "whether Arkansas' evidentiary rule prohibiting
the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony violated peti-
tioner's right to testify on her own behalf as a defendant in a crimi-
nal case." 98
87 Id.
88 The examiner was Dr. Back. To determine the scope of Vickie's prehypnosis
memory, the court compared Dr. Back's prehypnosis notes with the testimony Vickie
offered at trial. Any testimony made by Vickie that was not recorded in Dr. Back's notes
was deemed inadmissible. Id.
89 Id. at 2707 n.3.
90 Id. at 2707 n.4.
91 Id. at 2707.
92 Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 573, 708 S.W.2d 78, 81 (1986).
93 Id. at 578, 708 S.W.2d at 84.
94 Id. at 579, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
95 Id., 708 S.W.2d at 85.
96 Id. at 580, 708 S.W.2d at 86.
97 107 S. Ct. 430 (1986).
98 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2706.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
Writing for the majority,99 Justice Blackmun rejected the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court's per se rule against the admission of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony as a violation of Vickie Lorene Rock's right
as a criminal defendant to testify on her own behalf.10 0 Justice
Blackmun traced the historic concern for the trustworthiness of a
party's testimony' 01 through the common law protection of the ac-
cused from the ill inferences of choosing not to testify or the rigors
of cross-examination 10 2 to the modem recognition that, for de-
tecting guilt and protecting innocence, the criminally accused is
competent to testify.'03 Justice Blackmun noted that there is " 'no
rational justification for prohibiting the swom testimony of the ac-
cused, who above all others may be in a position to meet the prose-
cutor's case.' "104
Beyond competence, Justice Blackmun construed a right to tes-
tify from several provisions of the United States Constitution.10 5
Citing Faretta v. California,10 6 Ferguson v. Georgia,10 7 and In re Oliver,108
99 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens constituted the
majority.
100 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15.
101 Id. at 2708. Justice Blackmun cited Wigmore, who described eighteenth century
testimonial privileges as subject to the syllogism, "[t]otal exclusion from the stand is the
proper safeguard against a false decision, whenever the persons offered are of a class
specially likely to speak falsely; persons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the
cause are likely to speak falsely; therefore such persons should be totally excluded." 2J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 576, at 810 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
102 Justice Blackmun quoted Wigmore for the common law position:
[i]f, being competent, [the accused] failed to testify, that (it was believed) would
damage his cause more seriously than if he were able to claim that his silence were
enforced by law. Moreover, if he did testify, that (it was believed) would injure
more than assist his cause, since by undergoing the ordeal of cross-examination, he
would appear at a disadvantage dangerous even to an innocent man.
2J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579, at 828 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
103 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2708 (construing Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 581
(1961)). In Ferguson, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Georgia statute that
limited a criminal defendant's ability to make an unsworn statement to the jury in con-
junction with another Georgia statute that denied a criminal defendant the opportunity
to be questioned by counsel. 365 U.S. at 596. Justice Blackmun cited this decision to
illustrate the elimination of competency standards in the United States and in support of
his fourteenth amendment due process rationale. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
104 Id. at 2708 (quoting Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582).
105 Id. at 2709. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
106 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that "a defendant in a
state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he volunta-
rily and intelligently elects to do so." Id. at 807 (emphasis in original). Justice Blackmun
noted that this decision grants criminal defendants broad governance over the presenta-
tion of their defense. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709.
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Justice Blackmun concluded that the opportunity to give testimony
in one's own defense is among a catalogue of rights " 'essential to
due process of law in a fair adversary process' "109 guaranteed in
state criminal trials by the fourteenth amendment."10
Additionally, Justice Blackmun asserted that Washington v.
Texas"' and United States v. Valenzuela-Berna112 support a finding
that the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment confers
upon the accused a right to testify. 1 3 Justice Blackmun noted that
the defense's most important witness may, at times, be the ac-
cused. 114 Justice Blackmun identified self-representation and the
right to tell one's own story as fundamental to any criminal
defense.11 5
Justice Blackmun also observed that a corollary to the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the option to tes-
tify. 1 16 Justice Blackmun gleaned authority for this proposition
from Harris v. New York's 1 7 dissenting opinions. 1 8 Justice Black-
107 365 U.S. 570, 581 (1961).
108 333 U.S. 257 (1948). In re Oliver is scarcely related to the issue in Rock. The
petitioner in that case successfully challenged his conviction for contempt of court by a
one-man grand jury. 333 U.S. at 259. The Supreme Court held that the "failure to
afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of
false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law." Id. at 273. Justice Black-
mun quoted broad language from the opinion granting a criminal defendant "'an op-
portunity to be heard in his defense.'" Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273).
109 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819).
110 Id.
111 388 U.S. 14 (1967). In Washington, the Supreme Court held that the sixth amend-
ment right to compulsory process of witnesses is applicable to state criminal trials
through the fourteenth amendment, id. at 19, and that the petitioner was denied that
right in this case by a Texas statute prohibiting as witnesses principals in, accomplices
in, or accessories to the same crime. Id. at 23.
112 458 U.S. 858 (1982). Justice Blackmun cited Valenzuela-Bernal as authority for the
proposition that a criminal defendant has a right under the sixth amendment to present
testimony "'material and favorable to his defense.' " Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2709 (quoting
Valenzuela-B ernal, 458 U.S. at 867). The petitioner's compulsory and due process claims
were actually rejected in this decision because, the Court held, an allegation of a viola-
tion of either the sixth or fifth amendments requires a showing of materiality and favora-
bleness. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872-73. Deportation of defense witnesses in this
case was an insufficient showing. Id.
113 Rock, 107 U.S. at 2709.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2710.
117 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Supreme Court held in Harris that a prior conflicting
statement made by a criminal defendant could be used to impeach his or her credibility
even though the statement is inadmissible as evidence of guilt. Id. at 226. Justices Bren-
nan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented on fifth amendment grounds, stating: "[T]he ac-
cused is denied an 'unfettered' choice when the decision whether to take the stand is
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mun noted that the proviso against compelled testimony is fully en-
forced only when the accused is given "'the right to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will.' "119
The only circumstance in which a state's procedural or eviden-
tiary rules may impinge upon a criminal defendant's right to present
relevant testimony, concluded Justice Blackmun, is where some
greater interest, proportionate to the rights of the criminally ac-
cused, is served and applied in a non-arbitrary manner. 120 Justice
Blackmun cited the statute in Washington as an example of a state
rule that was laudably designed to ensure the trustworthiness of evi-
dence, but that arbitrarily and, thus, unconstitutionally inhibited a
criminal defendant from presenting evidence "'relevant and mate-
rial to the defense.' "121 By reference, Justice Blackmun impliedly
approved of the rationale in Washington that the sixth amendment
was designed " 'to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses
admissible on his behalf in court.' "122
Moreover, Justice Blackmun interpreted the holding in Chambers
v. Mississippi123 to be: "[W]hen a state rule of evidence conflicts
with the right to present witnesses, the rule may 'not be applied
mechanistically to defeat the ends ofjustice,' but must meet the fun-
damental standards of due process."' 24 With his citations to Wash-
ington and Chambers, Justice Blackmun defined a standard of review
of state evidentiary rules grounded in constitutional considera-
burdened by the risk that an illegally obtained prior statement may be introduced to
impeach his direct testimony . Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2710.
119 Id. (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971)(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
120 Id. at 2711.
121 Id. (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 23).
122 Id. at 2711 (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 22).
123 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the petitioner challenged both Mississippi's
party witness or voucher rule and a state hearsay rule as impinging upon his fourteenth
amendment due process rights. Id. at 285. The petitioner was implicated in a murder
by a state witness who had formerly confessed to the crime and then repudiated his
confession. Id. at 287-88. Through the operation of the Mississippi rules, the petitioner
was unable to cross-examine the witness and present his own witnesses to challenge the
state witness' repudiation. Id. at 294.
124 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302). Actually, the Chambers
Court's holding was:
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the State's
refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine [the witness], denied him a trial in
accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process.... [W]e hold
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the
trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302-03.
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tions. 125 Justice Blackmun reasoned from the outcomes of those de-
cisions that "U]ust as a State may not apply an arbitrary rule of
competence to exclude a material defense witness from taking the
stand, it also may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness
to take the stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his
testimony."1 26
On that basis, Justice Blackmun concluded that "[t]he Arkansas
Supreme Court failed to perform the constitutional analysis that is
necessary when a defendant's right to testify is at stake."'127 Con-
ceding that serious risks accompany the admission of hypnotically
refreshed testimony, 2 8 justice Blackmun concluded that aper se rule
of inadmissibility "operates to the detriment of any defendant who
undergoes hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the cir-
cumstances under which it took place, or any independent verifica-
tion of the information it produced."' 129 Without "clear evidence by
the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollec-
tions,"130 Justice Blackmun reasoned that it cannot be shown that
"hypnotically enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so
immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it
should disable a defendant from presenting her version of the
events for which she is on trial."' 3 1 Justice Blackmun viewed
"[w]holesale inadmissibility"' 132 as an arbitrary restriction and,
therefore, constitutionally impermissible. 133
B. THE DISSENT
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist' 34 endorsed the Arkansas
Supreme Court's exclusion of Vickie Lorene Rock's "hypnotically
125 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2710-11.
126 Id. at 2711.
127 Id. at 2712.
128 Id. at 2713-14. Justice Blackmun cited with little commentary several scientific
sources. See sources cited supra notes 8, 11, 23, and 66 and accompanying text.
129 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712.
130 Id. at 2714.
131 Id. Justice Blackmun endorsed the Orne safeguards, supra notes 42 and 69, as a
means of reducing the inaccuracies of hypnotically refreshed testimony, but he left to
the states the formulation of specific guidelines to aid trial courts in making admissibility
determinations. Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2714-15. Justice Blackmun carefully noted that the gun expert's corroborat-
ing testimony and the trial court's conclusion that Dr. Back's questioning was not lead-
ing "present an argument for admissibility . . . in this particular case." Id. at 2714.
Justice Blackmun did not, however, explicitly state that these factors are necessary for
admissibility in future cases.




induced testimony"'135 as "an entirely permissible response to a
novel and difficult question."13 6 Emphasisizing Justice Blackmun's
concession concerning the unreliability of hypnosis, the Chief Jus-
tice criticized the majority for requiring each state trial court "to
make its own scientific assessment of reliability in each case [in
which] it is confronted with a request for the admission of hypnoti-
cally induced testimony."' 37 ChiefJustice Rehnquist added that, by
admitting evidence derived through reliance on an unresolved sci-
ence, "the Court chooses... to restrict the ability of both state and
federal courts to respond to changes in the understanding of
hypnosis." 38
The Chief Justice agreed that the Court has formerly recog-
nized the right of a defendant to testify on his or her own behalf "in
dictum,"' 39 but he emphasized that "throughout our decisions...
an individual's right to present evidence is subject always to reason-
able restrictions."'' 40 This is true, according to ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist, in alleged due process' 4 ' as well as compulsory process
135 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
136 Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
137 Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The ChiefJustice inaccurately character-
ized the Court's ruling as requiring a scientific determination in each case. By acknowl-
edging the implications of the scientific data and still ruling as he did, Justice Blackmun
purposely limited future debate regarding the admission of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony to constitutional queries of the type courts deal with every day. See infra note 168.
138 Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). It is difficult to logically reconcile what
the ChiefJustice characterizes as the majority's case-by-case rule with his critique of that
rule as inhibiting flexible response to future changes.
139 Id. at 2715 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJustice cited Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 819, as providing this dictum, but said, without elaborating, that the principles "un-
derlying this right provide little support for invalidating the evidentiary rule applied by
the Arkansas Supreme Court." Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2715 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
ChiefJustice Rehnquist then criticized Justice Blackmun's use of Ferguson, again for un-
stated reasons. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief'Justice did note an inconsis-
tency between the majority's granting of a right to criminal defendants to testify and the
limitation of the Arkansas rule on that right because, he said, both were intended to
facilitate truth-seeking. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJustice ignored the
fact thatJustice Blackmun's rationale for invalidating the Arkansas rule was based upon
concerns that go beyond truth-seeking. See supra notes 99-133 and accompanying text.
140 Id. at 2715-16 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). In a footnote, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
mentioned testimonial privileges and rules disqualifying infants and the mentally infirm
as not offending a criminal defendant's constitutional rights and said: "I fail to discern
any meaningful constitutional difference between such rules and the one at issue here."
Id. at 2716 n* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The difference lies in the impact these rules
have on the defendant. These nonarbitrary categories may affect one aspect of the pres-
entation of a defense, but they do not directly inhibit the defendant from testifying.
141 Chief Justice Rehnquist cited In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273, 275, Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)
as examples of situations in which "an individual's right to present evidence on his be-
half.., must ... give way to countervailing considerations." Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716
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violations.' 42  Moreover, the Chief Justice cited Marshall v.
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). No language in the pages cited by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
in In re Oliver supports this proposition.
In Morrissey, the Supreme Court considered whether fourteenth amendment due
process rights require "that a State afford an individual some opportunity to be heard
prior to revoking his parole." Morrissey, 488 U.S. at 472. The pages ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist cited cryptically discuss due process as being "flexible and call[ing] for such proce-
dural protections as the particular situation demands.... Its flexibility is in its scope
once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Id. at
481. ChiefJustice Rehnquist might have been better served by quoting then ChiefJus-
tice Burger's subsequent language that "[w]e cannot write a code of procedure; that is
the responsibility of each State," id. at 488, but that would have required that he deal
with the Court's follow-up statement that "[o]ur task is limited to deciding the minimum
requirements of due process." Id. at 488-89.
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that due pro-
cess entitles a welfare recipient to an evidentiary hearing before any benefits are termi-
nated. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261. The passage cited by the Chief Justice reads:
" '[C]onsideration of what due process may require under any given set of circumstances
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function in-
volved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by government action.'"
Id. at 263 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)). This language implies little more than the testJustice Blackmun formulated in
the majority opinion. See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
142 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice said that
"our Compulsory Process Clause decisions make clear that the right to present relevant
testimony 'may, in appropriate cases, bow to accomodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process.'" Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)(quoting Chambers,
410 U.S. at 295). The full text reads: "[Tihe right to confront and to cross-examine is
not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accomodate other legitimate inter-
ests in the criminal trial process .... But its denial or significant diminution calls into
question the ultimate 'integrity of the factfinding process' and requires that the compet-
ing interest be closely examined." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (quoting Berger v. Califor-
nia, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
In the same paragraph, Rock, 107 S. Ct at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), Chief
Justice Rehnquist slightly altered a passage from Chambers that begins: "Few rights are
more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense....
In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with
established rules of procedures and evidence designed to assure both fairness and relia-
bility in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. The
ChiefJustice's alteration concluded that "[t]he Constitution does not in any way relieve
a defendant from compliance with 'rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.'" Rock, 107 S.
Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302). The Chief
Justice also ignored the outcome of Chambers, upon whichJustice Blackmun relied, that a
state rule applied" 'mechanistically' "is unconstitutional. Id. at 2711 (quoting Chambers,
410 U.S. at 302).
The Chief Justice's citation to Washington, Rock, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (construing 388
U.S. at 22), is questionable support for his compulsory process claim. In Washington, the
Supreme Court said that
it could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the [compulsory process]
clause if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law. It
is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that
prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori
categories that presume them unworthy of belief.
870 [Vol. 78
1988] HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY 871
Lonberger 143 and Patterson v. New York 144 to support his contention
that the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to state " 'estab-
lishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and
procedures.' "145 Parenthetically, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted
that " '[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts
to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary
rules' "146 and that " '[w]e should not lightly construe the Constitu-
tion so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the indi-
vidual States.' "147 The Chief Justice concluded that constitutional
considerations do not warrant invalidation of "a rule designed to
exclude testimony whose trustworthiness is inherently suspect."'148
V. ANALYSIS
As the resolution to a relatively simple fact situation, the
Court's decision in Rock v. Arkansas seems intuitively correct.' 49
Convicting a woman of manslaughter without affording her the op-
portunity to fully testify because she was hypnotized prior to trial
Washington, 388 U.S. at 22.
143 459 U.S. 422 (1983). In Marshall, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a
prior conviction in the defendant's murder trial "deprived respondent of no federal
right." Id. at 438.
144 432 U.S. 197 (1977). In Patterson, the Supreme Court held that New York's bur-
dening of a defendant accused of murder with proving an extreme emotional distur-
bance defense does not violate his or her fourteenth amendment due process rights. Id.
at 210. The situation in Rock is distinguishable from those in Marshall and Patterson in
that the violation alleged by Vickie did not impose additional burdens upon her defense,
but, rather, substantially limited her opportunity to present a defense at all.
145 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S at
302-03).
146 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Marshall, 459 U.S. at 438). This is actu-
ally a direct quotation from Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 564 (1967)(Texas proce-
dure of admitting evidence of prior conviction at guilt-determination stage of trial for
purpose of sentencing not unconstitutional), Preceding the language quoted by the
Chief Justice is the statement that "[c]ases in this Court have long proceeded on the
premise that the Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in
a criminal trial." Id. at 564.
147 Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)(quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at
201). Neither the language in Marshall nor that in Patterson is dispositive. The relevant
inquiry concerns the infringement of Vickie's constitutional rights under the fifth, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments. Resolution of that question does not require a finely
tuned review of state evidentiary rules. Nor does resolution of that question lightly con-
strue constitutional considerations for the criminally accused.
148 Id. at 2716 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
149 Interviewed after the decision in Rock, Martin Orne agreed that a criminal defend-
ant ought to be allowed to offer hypnotically refreshed testimony because of the protec-
tions entitled to him, and because "the judge or jury takes into account that he is putting
his best foot forward." Stewart, Hypnotized Witnesses, Loaded Jurors, 73 A.B.A. J. 54, 57
(1987).
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offends modern conceptions of justice. 5 0 As a statement of law by
the Supreme Court of the United States, however, the decision in
Rock also provides a judicial paradigm for formulating an appropri-
ate standard to determine whether hypnotically refreshed testimony
should be admitted in criminal trials.
None of the state standards proposed prior to Rock provide an
adequate means by which to evaluate the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony in every case.' 5 ' The standards attempt to
resolve questions of fact a priori 152 or demonstrate a confusion be-
tween admissibility and sufficiency. t 53 The standards ignore consti-
tutional guarantees in criminal trials 154 and strain the existing
balance between judge and jury by limiting the function of each.
By transcending concerns for the potential unreliability of hyp-
nosis and refining the judicial role in making evidentiary decisions
regarding testimony derived therefrom, the rule in Rock places ques-
tions of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony within
150 Actually, the injustice done to Vickie was the limitation of her testimony to state-
ments consistent with Dr. Back's sketchy notes. Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712. Compliance
with the third Hurd guideline, supra note 42, or the recommendation that a full narrative
description of the subject's memory regarding the incident be recorded prior to the
hypnosis session, Orne, supra note 9, at 45, would have alleviated much of the injustice
by expanding the scope of her testimony in an allowable manner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3503
(1982)(in "exceptional circumstances," depositions to preserve testimony permitted in
criminal trials). This apparent solution, however, merely begs resolution of the question
this Note addresses. It does not answer whether a codification of this precaution, like
any of the other standards previously discussed for dealing with hypnotically refreshed
testimony, eliminates potential injustices to criminal defendants in the presentation of
their defense.
151 The exception for defendants who have been hypnotized under California's per se
rule of inadmissibility, People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 67, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384, 181
Cal.Rptr. 243, 273 (1982), comes closest to the standard espoused in this Note. This
mechanical approach, however, is incapable of dealing with hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony in situations that demand a specific determination.
152 The per se inadmissibility standard is essentially a conclusion based on expert testi-
mony refuting the content of hypnotically refreshed testimony as a matter of course
before that content is examined.
153 "Admissibility" requires only that the evidence offered increase the probability
that that which is to be proven by the evidence is true. "Relevant evidence means evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. "Sufficiency" is a conclusion about the evidence to be
made by the factfinder that that which was to be proven true is true. The procedural
prerequisites standard tends to require trial courts to make determinations on the truth
of the matters asserted beyond that required by the probity standard.
154 Not only does the per se standard impinge upon a criminal defendant's right to
present a defense, Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15, but, a general rule of admissibility, like
the credibility but not admissibility standard, also impinges upon a defendant's constitu-
tional protections. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
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a preliminary constitutional framework. 155 The fifth, sixth, and
fourteenth amendments' 56 appropriately afford criminal defendants
liberal opportunity to present a defense. Consequently, when offer-
ing hypnotically refreshed testimony, the defense is subject to a low
standard of admissibility. However, whether this translates into a
lower standard than that which the prosecution must meet in offering
similar testimony is not addressed in Rock. 15 7 As a viable rule for
determining the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony,
the rule to be derived from Rock should provide such a lower stan-
dard of admissibility only for the defense.
In the typical situation in which hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony is offered at trial, an alleged victim or eyewitness with memory
failure identifies a defendant as a perpetrator of a crime subsequent
to hypnosis and then is called to testify for the state. 158 All of the
concerns associated with hypnotically refreshed testimony re-
main.15 9 In this situation, however, the possibility of a suggested
identification, of a confabulated accusation, or of a damning associa-
tion that is the result of pseudomemory may lead to a wrongful con-
viction. Although, theoretically, the likelihood of inaccuracy of
hypnotically refreshed testimony admitted against a criminal de-
fendant is as great as it would be if admitted against the state, the
presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system magnifies
the injustice imposed upon a defendant when possibly unreliable ev-
idence is admitted to obtain a conviction. 160
Moreover, under the sixth amendment, 161 the right to confront
155 This reading of Rock may be logically derived from the assumption that the three
objectives of formulating evidentiary rules are to "[a]void the introduction of collateral
matters and keep the evidence confined to the operative issues of the case .... [I]imit
evidence to material whose probative value is not outweighed by the prejudice it may
produce .... [and p]rotect the constitutional rights of the parties." R. UDOLF, supra note
11, at 59. Analytically, then, the rule in Rock places greatest weight on this third
objective.
156 See supra notes 3-5.
157 "This case does not involve the admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized
witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express no opinion on that issue."
Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2712 n.15.
158 In every case surveying the pre-Rock decisions dealing with hypnotically refreshed
testimony, the source of the testimony was either an alleged victim of the crime or a
witness for the prosecution. See supra notes 37, 42, 47, 53-56 and accompanying text. A
rule limiting admissibility in these situations would, therefore, likely limit the admission
of hypnotically refreshed testimony overall.
159 See Rock, 107 S. Ct. at 2711-15.
160 After Rock, Martin Orne maintained his opposition to the admission of state-spon-
sored hypnotically refreshed testimony. "'[I]f you change the memory of an unbiased
witness or a victim (through hypnosis), it is a catastrophe, because you can convict any-
one.'" Stewart, supra note 149, at 57.
161 See supra note 4.
1988] 873
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
one's accusers is a guaranteed part of any criminal defense. Because
hypnosis may impinge upon the ability of cross-examination to re-
veal inconsistencies, 162 a rule admitting state-sponsored hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony would seem to constrain a defendant's
constitutional rights as recognized in Rock. 163 Thus, Rock provides a
context within which a standard for the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony may be discussed. 164
An appropriate state standard enlisting the constitutional analy-
sis in Rock should be generally to admit hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony on behalf of the defense and generally exclude hypnotically
refreshed testimony on behalf of the prosecution. 165 The party of-
fering the evidence should have the burden of coming forward with
a video recording of the hypnosis session(s) prior to trial, 166 a copy
of which should be supplied to opposing counsel. 167 Challenges to
162 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
163 It can be argued that this analysis uses the scientific data too conveniently. The
data is ignored so that a justification may be made for admitting a defendant's evidence.
The data is relied upon to inhibit the prosecution from offering the testimony. Such
criticism is valid and precisely the point. By prioritizing the evidentiary considerations
as the Court did in Rock, an appropriate standard of admissibility uses the current scien-
tific conclusions always to the defendant's advantage.
164 This reading of the logic of the majority opinion skews the ideological split within
the Court. Justice Blackmun's endorsement, though qualified, of the reliability of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony is an unnecessary supplement to his constitutional frame-
work. Ironically, allegiance to ChiefJustice Rehnquist's state deference argument might
read as an unchecked license for local courts to admit testimony the Chief Justice op-
posed as unreliable. But, this is not the only possible interpretation of Rock.
In State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 530 A.2d 155 (1987), the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the alleged victim's posthypnosis
testimony because that testimony was consistent with her prehypnosis statements. Id. at
81, 530 A.2d at 165-66. Avoiding a determination on the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony after Rock because of that consistency, id. at 85, 530 A.2d at 167, the
court referred in dicta to Rock as a decision delineating procedural prerequisites more
than providing a constitutional framework for resolving this evidentiary issue. Id. at 79,
530 A.2d at 164. Despite this inaccurate assessment of Rock, the Connecticut court
reached a conclusion that is consistent with the standard espoused in this Note because
of the critical distinction between hypnotically refreshed testimony and posthypnosis
testimony. See supra note 2.
165 This is not an entirely novel idea:
There is an alternative approach to the problem of the admissibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony that the auther finds appealing .... It is based on the belief
that it is a more serious error to convict an innocent defendant than to acquit a
guilty one. Hence, it might be proposed to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony
of defense witnesses freely leaving the issue of their credibility to the jury while
invoking stricter standards for testimony of prosecution witnesses.
R. UDOLF, supra note 11, at 168.
166 "Without such a recording it is impossible to evaluate the probability that factual
error has been introduced into the testimony as a result of faulty technique." Id. at 166.
Challenges to credibility of the witness based on examination of the tape could then be
offered at trial.
167 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 612: "[Where a witness uses a writing to refresh memory,] an
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or support for the testimony of the formerly hypnotized witness
would then have to be resolved at a pretrial hearing.1 68 If, however,
the defense offers the videotape without objection by the prosecu-
tion, the witness' testimony should be freely admitted. Only if the
state makes a showing overcoming the constitutional concerns for
the defendant should its hypnotically refreshed testimony be
admitted.
This is not an espousal of two per se rules: one always admitting
defense hypnotically refreshed evidence and one always prohibiting
the prosecution's hypnotically refreshed evidence.1 69 If a defendant
is discovered faking hypnosis so as to contrive exonerating testi-
mony or purposely lying while hypnotized, the evidence possibly
ought not be admitted.170 Circumstances in which the state is some-
how able to overcome the constitutional protections of the crimi-
nally accused may justify the admission of such evidence.' 7 ' Also,
the possibility of a defense witness offering hypnotically refreshed
testimony does not clearly fit within constitutional parameters ad-
dressed heretofore by any courts, thus requiring a case-by-case eval-
uation of admissibility.'72
Nor is the rule proposed in this Note intended or likely to result
in the abuse of the privilege it affords criminal defendants. The fre-
quency of use of hypnosis by future parties will be regulated by the
adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect [and] to
cross-examine the witness thereon ...." The rule also allows material portions of the
writing to be introduced into evidence. Admission of the tape of the hypnosis session is
an appropriate tool to challenge the witness' credibility. However, this raises other con-
cerns that must be resolved in each case. Cf. Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.,
771 F.2d 1112, 1124 (8th Cir. 1985)(civil case in which issue of admission of videotape
of the hypnosis session said to raise prejudicial concerns under the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See supra note 59).
168 The inquiry would be much different under this bifurcated rule than that involved
in a highly discretionary standard like that in Iwakiri, see supra notes 47-53 and accompa-
nying text, because it is legal, not scientific. The analysis required of a trial court con-
fronted with a request that hypnotically refreshed testimony be admitted would center
around the constitutional concerns for the criminally accused. Any scientific challenges
to the testimony ought to be put forth at trial to impeach the credibility of the witness.
This rule, therefore, eliminates the judicial burden of making scientific determinations
about the reliability of the testimony and leaves questions of sufficiency to the factfinder.
169 Practically, however, this may be the effect given the substantial weight of the
criminal defendant's constitutional protections.
170 The weasal word "possibly" is added because, if the state has discovered that a
defendant feigned hypnosis, it could presumably impeach his or her credibility at trial in
an effective manner, thereby eliminating the necessity of excluding the testimony.
171 "May" is meant to greatly limit the scope of such situations.
172 The constitutional protections afforded a defendant by the Court in Rock are not
clearly applicable to defense witnesses. But, a rule consistent with the latitude afforded
a defendant in putting forth his or her defense suggests that defense witnesses' hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony should also be generally admissible.
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credibility juries give hypnotically refreshed testimony. Credibility
may be challenged by expert testimony explaining the unreliability
of hypnosis or other conflicting evidence. Assuming juries are as
capable of determining the proper weight to be given hypnotically
refreshed testimony as they are deemed capable of examining other
types of evidence, 173 the jury serves as a check on the liberal admis-
sibility standard for hypnotic evidence offered by the defense. The
jury is capable of responding to changing scientific perceptions of
the reliability of hypnosis and, thus, will monitor the future use of
hypnotically refreshed testimony.
VI. CONCLUSION
Concerns in criminal trials for the accuracy of evidence admit-
ted and the outcome of the proceeding are at odds in many of the
variations of standards used to determine the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony. Liberal rules of admissibility chal-
lenge confrontational protections developed from constitutional
interpretation. Stringent rules of admissibility discount testimonial
privileges that have historically evolved to guarantee fair trials to
those accused of crimes.
Rock v. Arkansas provides an analytical framework by which
states may direct concerns for accuracy and outcome toward a viable
standard of admissibility that limits the prejudicial impact hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony may have upon criminal defendants. By
adopting a standard that generally admits hypnotically refreshed
testimony offered by the defense and that generally excludes hyp-
notically refreshed testimony offered by the prosecution, state
courts can lend efficient and appropriate coherence to this complex
evidentiary matter. Grounded in presumptions fundamental to the
American criminal justice system, the bifurcated standard put forth
in this Note serves to punctuate an all too lengthy debate over the
use of hypnosis in a manner that does not sacrifice fairness for
expediency.
FRANCIS P. KUPLICKI
173 Our legal system is based on the premise that juries are competent to decide
contested issues of fact and ultimate guilt or innocence based on sound instructions
from the court concerning the law. Ira lay jury, with the help of expert testimony, is
not capable of deciding the probative value of hypnotic evidence intelligently, how
can it evaluate the sanity of a defendant based on the same kind of testimony? If it
can do both, there is no need for legislation concerning hypnotic evidence. If it can
do neither, it makes no sense to exclude hypnotic evidence while continuing to per-
mit juries to decide the issue of insanity. A basic restructuring of our legal system
would be required.
R. UDOLF, supra note 11, at 167.
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